Saturday, April 15, 2017

Inquiry into desire and ill will

Last couple weeks I've been working on breaking the Ten Fetters using the technique of a fellow named Satyadana as shared in the Liberation Unleashed forum and facebook group. (Although anyone can go to the forum-- and I highly recommend you do if you're curious-- the material on breaking the Ten Fetters is only available to you after you've gone through their process of seeing through the illusion of self-- again, highly recommended.)

Was reading a thread wherein a student was being guided to look at desire for chocolate. The guide instructed them to see what the initial sensation is when first seeing chocolate. I thought I knew what the initial sensation was for me: an uncomfortable conglomeration of tensions in the body that I call craving. But when I looked more closely-- when I first looked at a blank wall, then looked at the chocolate, alert to the initial sensations-- I saw that before the conglomeration there is a neutral sensation in the back of the mouth/top of the throat. Exciting to see that!

Now I am supposed to stay with that initial sensation, notice the nascent reaction (the conglomeration of sensation and thought I call craving) without yielding to it, and inquire: what links the two? This inquiry is called "staying in the gap".

If I can stay in the gap-- and I can-- clearly the reaction does not necessarily have to happen. Supposedly, seeing this really clearly can weaken and even break craving and ill will across the board, for all objects. Super exciting!

For me, the link seems to be a thought chain: first, "here is a food I especially enjoy". Then, "I should try to consume it because it is productive to obtain and consume delightful things; it builds up the Terry entity".

This second thought I know to be false. Even the first is suspect.

What makes those thoughts arise? Clearly they don't have to. I suppose it's habit.

I intend to do this exercise some more and see if craving in general diminishes.




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